5.1 Liquid Assets


Major ADIs - Big 4 vs Balance of Top 15
Top 15 Banks by Liquid Assets - The left panel shows 'Big Four' banks, I've split the balance of the ADIs on the right panel, highlighting Macquarie for obvious reasons. The right panel is on a different scale. Macquarie is too big for the rest and not quite big enough for the big four.


All four majors (CBA, WBC, NAB, ANZ) display a step-up in liquid-asset proxies through 2021, lifting from ~A$100bn to closer to A$150–175bn. This coincides with the RBA’s Term Funding Facility (TFF) and broader liquidity injections during the pandemic period, when banks parked substantial funds in high-quality liquid assets. After 2022, when the CLF concluded and TFF closed, the profiles diverge somewhat, but the common pattern is a plateau then some retracement into 2024–25. Macquarie detailed in thir FY22 Management Discussion and Analysis a “Cash and liquid assets $A78.6 bn” vs 51.0 a year earlier, and explicitly notes “Includes RBA TFF of $A11.3 billion”. I could have went into more detail here but in order to keep focus on housing and to avoid spending too much time here I conclude on views from the RBA and then look at the components of my proxy.

“By the end of February 2024, around $90 billion of the $188 billion… had been repaid. TFF repayments cause banks’ liquidity ratios to decline” FSR, March 2024. The RBA also notes banks replaced that funding by lifting wholesale issuance and term deposits as the TFF matured. RBA April Bulletin


I’ve indexed the components of the LA proxy (100 = first observation) to see on a relative scale how the components have evolved. I have also tabulated with actual values as a cross check.

Top 5 ADIs - Components of Liquid Asset Proxy
Components of Liquid Asset Proxy - Two things stand out at a glance. The Cash Deposits increase is off the charts. Particularly NAB. Secondly Investor & Trading securities may show Macquaries difference from the Big 4. I want to verify this.


At peak, between 2020 and its 2022, NAB’s cash holdings expanded more than 15× baseline, whereas peers expanded 6–8×. NAB’s latest cash represents an over 9x increase from the baseline. Macquarie’s investment securities have quadrupled since 2021, while Big Four holdings in trading securities have broadly stagnated.

Liquid Asset Components — Growth from First to Last Observation
Component First (A$b) Last (A$b) Change (A$b) Growth %
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited CashDeposits 15.3 37.4 22.1 144.9%
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited InvestSec 40.0 76.2 36.2 90.4%
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited TradingSec 27.8 20.9 -6.9 -24.9%
Commonwealth Bank of Australia CashDeposits 10.3 23.9 13.7 132.9%
Commonwealth Bank of Australia InvestSec 64.9 84.3 19.4 29.9%
Commonwealth Bank of Australia TradingSec 26.4 21.0 -5.4 -20.4%
Macquarie Bank Limited CashDeposits 3.6 10.9 7.3 200.3%
Macquarie Bank Limited InvestSec 5.1 18.5 13.4 264.5%
Macquarie Bank Limited TradingSec 7.6 19.5 11.8 155.5%
National Australia Bank Limited CashDeposits 6.4 57.8 51.4 801.2%
National Australia Bank Limited InvestSec 31.6 37.2 5.5 17.5%
National Australia Bank Limited TradingSec 52.2 39.8 -12.4 -23.7%
Westpac Banking Corporation CashDeposits 10.5 41.9 31.4 299.8%
Westpac Banking Corporation InvestSec 78.6 112.4 33.8 43.1%
Westpac Banking Corporation TradingSec 13.0 6.2 -6.8 -52.4%

From the datas perspective Macquarie has appeared to have a more broad based growth in its components (positive 150 to 260% growth) compared to the others, perhaps a nod to it’s structural difference and risk appetite. In annual reports reporting criteria differs from APRAs, varying consolidations and asset classifications. Pillar 3 disclosures (Basel III) are likely close analogues, but company filings are beyond my scope.

With that, I will move on to the Housing Assets.